The Peer Effect of Jose Canseco * This paper examines the issue of whether workers learn productive skills from their coworkers, even if those skills are unethical. Specifically, we estimate whether Jose Canseco, one of the best baseball players in the last few decades, affected the performance of his teammates. In his autobiography, Canseco claims that he improved the productivity of his teammates by introducing them to steroids. Using panel data on baseball players, we show that a player's performance increases significantly after they played with Jose Canseco. After checking 30 comparable players from the same era, we find that no other baseball player produced a similar effect. Clearly, Jose Canseco had an unusual influence on the productivity of his peers. These results are consistent with Canseco's controversial claims, and suggest that workers not only learn productive skills from their co-workers, but sometimes those skills may derive from unethical practices. These findings may be relevant to many workplaces where competitive pressures create incentives to adopt unethical means to boost productivity and profits.
Introduction
There is a growing literature that stresses the importance of the environment in determining the outcomes of individuals. Most of this literature is concerned with examining how peers and environmental factors a¤ect youth behavior regarding their educational achievements, health, criminal involvement, work status, and other economic outcomes. 1 This paper examines the issue of how workers a¤ect the productivity of other workers. If workers learn valuable skills and work habits from their co-workers, then "peer e¤ects" between workers should exist in many work environments. A peer e¤ect across workers could also result from behavioral considerations such as group norms, peer pressure, shame, and guilt.
Recent work suggests that peer e¤ects between workers are empirically signi…cant. 2 The existing literature, however, has not examined whether workers sometimes learn unethical practices from their co-workers in order to boost their productivity. A high payo¤ to performance naturally creates incentives to adopt any means necessary to boost productivity. Given that there is heterogeneity in skill, risk aversion, and moral character, these incentives will sometimes be strong enough for at least some workers to adopt unethical practices which enhance productivity. Once one worker adopts questionable methods which seem to be e¤ective, competitive pressures may lead others to follow suit in order to get ahead, or perhaps just to stay even with other workers who are adopting similar techniques.
This mechanism is a plausible explanation for the apparent widespread use of performanceenhancing drugs in baseball, cycling, and track and …eld. Outside the world of sports, this di¤usion process could show up through the adoption of dubious accounting methods, questionable ethics by lawyers, political corruption, noncompliance with public disclosure laws, cheating by students, biased reporting by the media, cheating in academic research, or other ways of skirting legal or ethical requirements. The literature on crime has found that criminal activity does respond to economic conditions (see Gould, Weinberg, and 1 Mustard, 2002) . Here, we highlight the idea that in the absence of persistent monitoring and rigid enforcement of ethical and legal practices, competitive pressures may lead to a "rat race" among workers to learn unethical behavior from co-workers in order to boost their productivity. As such, this paper makes a contribution to the recent literature that has demonstrated that agents do respond to incentives to cheat or engage in corruption (Duggan and Levitt, 2002; Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Wolfers, 2006 ; and Kuziemko and Werker, 2006) .
To examine the empirical relevance of this issue, we estimate whether Jose Canseco, one of the best baseball players in the 1980's and 1990's, a¤ected the productivity of his fellow teammates. Among his many accomplishments, Jose Canseco was the …rst player in professional baseball to join the "40-40 Club" (40 home runs and 40 stolen bases in a season). Canseco was not only one of the most productive players of his era, he was highly controversial both on and o¤ the …eld, and remains even more so after his retirement in 2001. During his playing career, he was frequently in the tabloids for incidents such as being arrested for bringing a loaded weapon onto a university campus, crashing his own car into his wife's car, and dating Madonna. While he was still playing, rumors circulated about his use of steroids, but he denied them and even considered suing reporters for libel. 3 However, when he retired in 2001, Canseco admitted to using steroids, and claimed that the phenomenon was so widespread that "there would be no baseball left if they drug-tested everyone today" (Bryant, 2005) .
In 2005, Canseco wrote a highly controversial book, "Juiced,"in which he claims not only to have taken steroids throughout his playing career, but also that he gave them to his fellow teammates. The self-proclaimed "Godfather of Steroids"claimed to be a pioneer of steroid use, and takes credit for igniting a contagion of drug use in professional baseball. 4 He speci…cally named six famous power-hitters that he claims to have personally injected with steroids, and claimed that his in ‡uence was much wider than that. He writes in his book (page 134): "My expertise on steroids could make other players around me a lot 3 "Once the rumour went out that I was on steroids-though no one presented smoking guns-I was persona-non-grata. I wanted to sue Boswell, but in the end, it just didn't seem worth my time."("Juiced", page 117) 4 Chapter 19 of "Juiced" is titled "The Godfather of Steroids." contacts on where to get them. I taught which steroid has which e¤ect on the body, and how to mix or "stack"certain steroids to get a desired e¤ect."
Canseco claimed that he shared his knowledge not only with other players, but also with trainers who would transmit the knowledge throughout the league. He writes (page 211) that: "As soon as the trainers I talked to started getting involved, the steroid ‡oodgates burst. However, considering Canseco's tarnished reputation and his penchant for doing just about anything for money, no one really knows whether his claims are true or whether they were part of a publicity stunt to help promote his book. His claims have been disputed, and even the Mitchell Report (2007) did not give much credence to his testimony, despite the fact that Canseco was one of the only current or former players who agreed to cooperate with the investigation. 10 Although many suspect that at least some of his claims are true, 6 In response to the Mitchell Report, Clemens denies all accusations of using steroids and human growth hormone, but admits to taking shots of B12. However, two years prior to the Mitchell Report (2007), Canseco not only claimed that the term "B12 shot" was a nickname for steroids, but he speci…cally mentioned that Clemens used that term as a euphemism for steroids in their conversations. Canseco writes on page 211: "I've never seen Roger Clemens do steroids, and he never told me that he did. But we've talked about what steroids could do for you, in which combinations, and I've heard him use the phrase B12 shot with respect to others." 7 The Mitchell Report states on page 168: "McNamee attended a lunch party that Canseco hosted at his home in Miami. McNamee stated that, during this luncheon, he observed Clemens, Canseco, and another person he did not know meeting inside Canseco's house, although McNamee did not personally attend that meeting. . . . Toward the end of the road trip which included the Marlins series, or shortly after the Blue Jays returned home to Toronto, Clemens approached McNamee and, for the …rst time, brought up the subject of using steroids. Clemens said that he was not able to inject himself, and he asked for McNamee's help." 8 Mitchell Report (2007) , page 168. 9 Canseco writes on page 211: "A lot of pitchers did steroids to keep up with hitters. If everyone else was getting stronger and faster, then you wanted to get stronger and faster, too. If you were a pitcher, and the hitters were all getting stronger, that made your job that much more di¢ cult. Roger (Clemens) used to talk about that a lot. 'You hitters are so darn strong from steroids,' he'd say. 'Yeah, but you pitchers are taking it too. You're just taking di¤erent types,'I'd respond." 10 Three of the seven players that Canseco claimed in his book that he personally injected with steroids were not even mentioned in the report (Ivan Rodriguez, Wilson Alvarez, and Dave Martinez). Three of the other players were cited by the report, but not for evidence provided by Canseco. Canseco also the same people often suspect that many are exaggerated. For example, Bryant (2005, page 373) writes of Jose Canseco and his book: He is the mysterious, frustrating character he was as a player: gifted, intelligent, and provocative, yet given to exaggeration, spite, and contradiction. In making his points, he violates the tenet of clubhouse secrecy that for years maintained the steroid era. He violates the trust of the players with whom he won and lost games, with whom he caroused, drank, and laughed. Canseco returns years of ridicule with a withering indictment of the sport. The results are smaller, but still signi…cant, if the sample excludes the six players that Jose Canseco claims to have personally injected with steroids. This pattern is consistent with the idea that these players did indeed bene…t from Canseco's human capital in chemistry, but they also might indicate that Canseco "cherry-picked" six of the most productive players that he played with, even if they are completely innocent, just for the promotional value of creating a larger scandal. Therefore, our …ndings that the results are signi…cant for both the entire sample (which Canseco could not possibly "cherry pick"for his book) and the sample without the six players present strong evidence that Canseco had a "positive" in ‡uence on the productivity of his teammates. We then check to see if 30 other comparable players from the same era generated similar positive e¤ects on their teammates. This analysis reveals no evidence of similar e¤ects from any other player named other players that he did not personally inject as users, and these players were not mentioned in the report either (Bret Boone, Tony Saunders, and Brady Anderson).
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-thus indicating that Jose Canseco had an unusual in ‡uence on the productivity of his teammates.
It is important to note that the results are not driven by a common shock to all players on the same team, which is always a potential problem in the identi…cation of peer e¤ects. There are several reasons for this. First, Canseco played on ten di¤erent teams throughout his career. In fact, the seven players that Canseco claimed to have injected played on three di¤erent teams with him. 11 Second, the positive e¤ect of Canseco on his peers shows up after they no longer play with him, and therefore, are playing for various teams in the league. So, the results could not come from a common shock to all players on one team. Third, as stated above, we found no evidence of peer e¤ects for six power-hitters who played with Canseco and shared the same coaches and team characteristics, which refutes the idea that the e¤ect is coming from the team rather than Canseco himself.
A word of caution is appropriate regarding the interpretation of our …ndings. Although the results are consistent with Canseco's claims that he improved his teammates by introducing them to steroids, the results cannot identify exactly why his teammates seemed to have bene…ted from playing with him. It is possible that they bene…tted from his workout habits, batting technique, work ethic, etc. However, in the very least, the evidence provides considerable back-up to his bravado: "I don't think there's any question that when I arrived in Texas the other Rangers saw me as a useful resource" ("Juiced," page 134). Given the multi-million dollar incentives inherent in professional baseball, we now show you why his teammates felt that way.
The Data and Background
The data was obtained from the "Baseball Archive"which is copyrighted by Sean Lahman, and is a freely available on the Internet for research purposes. The data contains extensive personal and yearly performance information on players, coaches, and teams for every Table 1 which shows that power hitters hit 9.55 homeruns per year versus 6.38 for position players. The slugging percentage is also considerably higher for power hitters. Table 1 also shows the means for variables which concern the extent to which players interacted with Canseco throughout his career. The variable "ever with Canseco" is a dummy variable for ever playing on the same team with Canseco, while the variable called "currently with Canseco" is a dummy variable for currently being on the same team as Canseco in a given year. Table 1 indicates the 12 percent of the players in the sample played with Canseco at some point in their careers, while 2 percent were currently playing with him in a given year. 12 The bottom panel of Table 1 presents summary statistics for pitchers. The standard indicator of a pitcher's performance is called the ERA (Earned Run Average). 13 A higher 12 Only 2 percent of the players played with Canseco in a given year because there are 30 teams in professional baseball (as of 2000), and Canseco played in only half of the seasons in our sample. 13 This measure takes the number of runs that a pitcher allows the opposing team to obtain, and scales it by the number of innings played, so that it represents the average number of runs which would have 7 ERA re ‡ects poorer performance. The average ERA is 4.20, while 13 percent of the pitchers played at some point with Canseco and 2 percent play concurrently on the same team with him. Table 2 Comparing these players to the overall average, Table 2 reveals a pattern which is very typical for excellent power hitters: many homeruns, very high slugging percentage, a little better than average batting average, many RBI's, and many strikeouts (since going for homeruns often results in strikes). Also, these players have higher than normal intentional walks and "base on balls"since the opposing teams often "pitch around"dangerous hitters to prevent them from getting a homerun.
Overall, Table 2 demonstrates that this list of players includes some of the best power hitters of their generation, although Dave Martinez is perhaps not quite at the same level as the others. The statistics for Jose Canseco certainly show that he belongs in this elite group, but he does not stand out among the group as being the absolute best. In the next section, we examine whether Jose Canseco a¤ected the performance of his peers, and then we compare the results for Canseco to those obtained by estimating the peer e¤ect been scored o¤ the pitcher in a full game. The ERA is calculated by: (number of earned runs/innings pitched)*9. Runs due to defensive errors by other players are not counted, hence the name "earned" run average.
14 In Canseco's book, he also named pitcher Wilson Alvarez, who is not included in the table because he is not a hitter. Ken Caminiti was the most valuable player in the National League 1996, but later admitted that he took steroids throughout his career. Table 2 plus 20 other players who are among the best homerun hitters of all-time).
The Empirical Analysis
This section examines how the performance of individual players is a¤ected by coming into contact with Jose Canseco. Figure 1 presents a naive analysis by showing the mean homeruns for three mutually exclusive categories of power hitting players: those that never played with Canseco, those that were playing concurrently with Canseco, and those that played with Canseco in the past. Figure 1 shows that players who played with Canseco in the past have much higher homeruns than those who played with him concurrently, and both of these groups have much higher homerun production than those that never played with him. Figure 2 displays a similar pattern regarding the slugging percentage -those that played with him are much better sluggers than those that did not.
This stark pattern could be due to the higher ability levels of players who happened to play with Canseco in the present and past, or it may be due to the causal e¤ect of Canseco on his peers. To control for the non-random allocation of players who might have played with Canseco over time, all regressions will include individual …xed-e¤ects.
Furthermore, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the e¤ect of Canseco on his peers may be di¤erent between current and former teammates. Therefore, to allow for the possibility that it may take a period of time for Canseco to a¤ect the performance of his teammates, the analysis examines whether there is evidence for an immediate e¤ect of Canseco on the output of current teammates and whether there is a lingering e¤ect of Canseco on former teammates. The basic regression equation is the following:
where the performance of player i in year t is a function of a dummy variable for whether he plays on the same team as Jose Canseco in year t (playing with canseco), a dummy variable for having played with Canseco in the past but not during year t (af ter canseco), the …xed ability of player i represented by i ; other observable control variables, and the unobserved component which varies over time, " it : 15 Separate regressions are run for each performance measure listed in Table 1 . The other control variables include: the batting average in player i's division (excluding his own team) in year t which controls for the quality of the pitching and batting in the team's division in the same year, the team manager's lifetime winning percentage which is an indicator for the quality of the team's coaching, the ballpark hitting factor which control for whether the team's ballpark is easy or di¢ cult for batters in year t, the player's years of experience (number seasons played in the league), year e¤ects, and dummy variables for each division. It is worth noting that these control variables have no e¤ect on our results for the other coe¢ cients. The unobserved ability of player i; i ; is controlled for by including …xed-e¤ects for each player i.
The main parameters of interest are 1 and 2 , which indicate whether Jose Canseco a¤ected the performance of his current or former teammates respectively. We model the potential e¤ect of Canseco on his peers as an intercept e¤ect, since the main factor is likely to be whether the person takes steroids or not, rather than learning how to inject steroids over time. Also, the distinction between playing "with Canseco" and playing "after Canseco"is important since even if a player did learn about steroids from Canseco, we do not know when he learned about it during his time with Canseco, but we can be sure that he already acquired the knowledge after playing with Canseco. The inclusion of a …xed-e¤ect for each player means that we are exploiting variation in performance levels within the career of each player, rather than exploiting variation in the types of players that may have played with Canseco over time. In this manner, the empirical strategy controls for the endogenous personnel decisions of team managers. Therefore, identi…cation of the parameters of interest comes from seeing whether variation within a given player's performance over time deviates from the typical player's experience pro…le in a way that is correlated with being a current or former teammate of Jose Canseco.
The basic …xed-e¤ect regressions for power hitters are presented in Table 3 . Each 15 If a player played with Canseco in non-consecutive years, the variable for "playing with Canseco" is equal to 1 for every year starting in the …rst year that the player played with Canseco until the last year that he played with Canseco. The variable "after Canseco" is equal to one for every year after the last year that the player played with Canseco. column represents a separate regression using the indicated performance measure as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows that after controlling for all the other variables, a given power player has more homeruns on average during years that he plays with Canseco (the estimate for 1 is 1.13 with standard error 0.66). However, homerun production seems to pick up even more after playing with Canseco (the estimate for 2 is 2.91 with standard error 0.64). The same pattern exists for all of the performance measures: strikeouts, RBI's, slugging percentage, batting average, intentional walks, and "base-on-balls." Each of these performance measures increase in a statistically signi…cant way after playing with Jose Canseco, but rarely are they statistically signi…cant while playing with Canseco. It is worth noting that an increase in each of these measures is indicative of a higher performing "power hitter": more homeruns, more strikeouts, a higher slugging percentage, and more attempts by the other team to "pitch around" a dangerous hitter (expressed by more intentional walks and base-on-balls).
The reason why playing with Canseco has a much smaller e¤ect than playing "after Canseco"may be due to the idea, mentioned above, that players who learn about steroids from Canseco do not take steroids during the whole time they are playing "with Canseco," but do use them during the entire time that they are former teammates with him. Alternatively, it may take some time for Canseco's positive e¤ect to be realized, or this pattern may be due to the fact that players who play with him spend more of their time as former teammates of Canseco than being current teammates of him. For example, power hitters who played at least one season with Canseco in our sample spent 17 percent of their seasons on a team with Canseco and 33 percent of their seasons being former teammates with him.
Also, the smaller e¤ect of playing with Canseco may be due to the idea that Canseco took away scarce team resources such as playing time, attention from coaches and trainers, etc. If this were true, then similar peer e¤ects should be found for other baseball stars. As we show later, we do not …nd similar e¤ects for other stars, which casts doubt on the hypothesis that star players "crowd out" the performance of other players. If, however, we do not di¤erentiate between current and former players by using one variable which indicates whether the player either plays currently or in the past with Canseco, the coe¢ cient for homeruns is 2.05, and is still highly signi…cant with a standard error of 0.549.
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The coe¢ cients in Table 3 are signi…cant statistically and also sizeable in magnitude.
The estimated e¤ect of playing "after Canseco"on homeruns is 2.91, which is 30.5% of the mean homerun production of power hitters (9.55) displayed in Table 1 . After playing with Jose Canseco, a typical power hitter is also estimated to increase his RBI's by 22 percent (a coe¢ cient of 9.174 compared to the mean RBI's of 41.78). Apparently, the bene…ts of playing with Canseco were quite large. Table 4 presents additional results for power hitters using alternative measures of performance. The …rst three columns show that Canseco had no discernible e¤ect on steals, …elding percentage, and …elding errors. Neither of these outcomes is considered particularly important for power hitting, nor are they typically thought of as being a¤ected by physical strength. So, the lack of any e¤ect for these outcomes strengthens the interpretation of the results in Table 3 that Canseco had a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on the hitting power of his former teammates by a¤ecting their physical strength.
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 4 show that power hitters signi…cantly increase their playing time (number of times at-bat and number of games played in a season) after playing with Canseco. 16 Contrary to the outcomes in the …rst three columns, playing time should increase for a power hitter if his hitting prowess has improved. 17 The e¤ect of Canseco on playing time could be a reason why we see several power hitting performance measures increase in Table 3 after playing with Canseco. For example, a power hitter will naturally tend to hit more homeruns and RBI's if they have more chances at bat. The …nal column of Table 4 re-runs the regression for homeruns but controls for number of at-bats. In comparison to the results in Table 3 which did not control for the number of at-bats, the results are much smaller but still statistically signi…cant. That is, a players homerun production increases after playing with Canseco even if we condition on the number of chances at bat. Also, it should be noted that two of the outcomes in Table 3 (slugging 16 Since playing time is clearly an endogenous outcome which seems to be a¤ected by Canseco, our preferred speci…cation does not include playing time as a control variable. However, as discussed later, the strong positive e¤ect of Canseco on his peers operates not only through increased playing time, but also on measures of performance that are normalized by playing time (slugging percentage and batting average). 17 Also, Canseco claimed that steroids help players recover from injuries faster, which could also increase playing time. In his personal case, he claimed that steroids extended his career by enabling him to play with serious back problems.
percentage and batting average) are already normalized by the number of at-bats, so the signi…cant results for these measures indicate that the positive e¤ect of Canseco on his teammates is not operating just through an increase in playing time.
We now turn our attention to see if Canseco had an e¤ect on other types of players (not power hitters). The upper panel of Table 5 runs similar regressions for a sample of skilled position players (not pitchers or power hitters) and pitchers. The results indicate that skilled position players did not increase their homerun production after playing with Canseco, but they did signi…cantly increase their batting average and slugging percentage.
Canseco had no discernible e¤ect on …elding percentage and steals. These results suggest that Canseco had no e¤ect on measures which clearly should not be a¤ected by steroids (…elding percentage and perhaps steals), but did have an e¤ect on measures that are important for these types of players (batting average and slugging percentage). If Canseco did a¤ect the physical strength of his former teammates, it is more likely to show up in the slugging percentage for these types of players than the number of homeruns, since they typically hit disproportionately more doubles and triples (which a¤ect the slugging percentage) than homeruns. The last column of Table 5 indicates that Canseco had no e¤ect on the performance of pitchers, measured by the pitcher's ERA. The lack of signi…cant results for pitchers is again consistent with the idea that Canseco only had an e¤ect by in ‡uencing the physical strength of his teammates -which is unlikely to a¤ect a pitcher's performance since pitching has very little to do with physical strength.
Given that Canseco named six speci…c batters which he claimed to have personally injected with steroids, it is natural to ask whether the results so far are coming from these speci…c players. Table 6 compares the results for power hitters using the full sample (Table 3) to the results obtained from a sample which deletes the six named players (Rafael Palmeiro, Jason Giambi, Mark McGwire, Juan Gonzalez, Ivan Rodriguez and Dave Martinez). Across all performance measures which are indicative of power hitting performance, the results are much weaker (roughly half the size) after we delete these players from the sample, but they are still statistically signi…cant. This pattern indicates that these six players are responsible for a sizable portion of the results, but there is still a signi…cant e¤ect of playing with Canseco even for other players -something we already saw in Table   13 5 which showed a signi…cant Canseco e¤ect for non-power hitters.
The fact that the results are much smaller when we delete these players from the sample could indicate that Canseco had the biggest e¤ect on the players that he speci…cally named. However, it is also true that Canseco had a good motive to name these speci…c players even if they were completely innocent. For example, Canseco may have named these speci…c players because they are high pro…le athletes and accusing them would help promote his book much more than accusing an unknown player of steroid use. Also, Canseco may have tried to take credit for their success, or tarnish their success in comparison to his diminished reputation. Even if Canseco deliberately lied about his e¤ect on other players, he had to know that his claims would be more believable and would help sell more books by choosing the most obvious high pro…le cases of players who clearly went on to have an outstanding career after playing with him. In other words, Canseco may have overstated his expertise in chemistry, but demonstrated an intuitive sense of basic statistics by naming the cases with the strongest correlation between individual performance and playing with him on the same team. For this reason, our preferred speci…cation is the one which includes the whole sample, since the e¤ect of playing with Canseco (and after Canseco) is identi…ed from a clearly exogenous variable which Canseco had no chance of a¤ecting during the course of writing of his book. For the same reasons, we did not check Canseco's other claims in his book about steroid use by players that did not play with him -since he could easily "cherry-pick"attention-grabbing names to accuse of steroid use. However, the fact that the results are still signi…cant for players other than the six named in the book is consistent with his claims that his expertise was valuable beyond those six players.
The Peer E¤ect of Similar Players
Having established that Canseco had a positive e¤ect on power hitters and even non-power hitters, we now examine whether other baseball stars of the same era generated similar e¤ects on their teammates. To allow for the possibility that other players may also generate a positive e¤ect by transmitting knowledge about steroids, we estimate the peer e¤ect of those that were named by Jose Canseco in his book. In addition, we estimate the peer e¤ect for Ken Caminiti who acknowledged that he took steroids during the height of his career. For the sake of a simple comparison, we also present results for three famous players who have never been mentioned as being involved in steroid use: Ken Gri¤ey Jr., Ryne Sandberg, and Cecil Fielder. As shown in Table 2 , all of the players are similar in the sense of having outstanding careers. Later, we will systematically choose 26 players who had similar careers as Jose Canseco, and compare the results for Canseco to those obtained for all 26 players. Table 7 presents the results using the same regression speci…cation used to estimate the peer e¤ect of Jose Canseco, but using one of the ten other players instead of Jose Canseco as the independent variable. One striking pattern that emerges is that many of the coe¢ cients are negative, in contrast to the results for Canseco which are uniformly positive on every outcome. The second striking pattern is that very few coe¢ cients are signi…cant, again in contrast to Canseco where every coe¢ cient is signi…cant. In fact, four of the ten players do not have one signi…cant coe¢ cient for any of the seven outcomes We perform a similar analysis for non-power hitters and pitchers in the bottom panel of Table 5 . In contrast to the upper panel of Table 5 which showed a positive e¤ect of Canseco on the slugging percentage and batting average, only two of the ten other baseball stars (Palmeiro and Sandberg) had an e¤ect on these measures of performance.
The other players exhibit no signi…cant e¤ects for any measure of performance, so once again, Jose Canseco seems to be in the minority in terms of his e¤ect on peers. In the last column of Table 5 , the results show that no player, including Canseco, a¤ected the pitching performance of their former teammates. This is the …rst case where Canseco seems to be similar to his other baseball stars. However, this similarity is consistent with the idea that even if Canseco did a¤ect the physical strength of his teammates, this should have no impact on his fellow pitchers since pitching is not related to physical strength. So, if physical strength is the mechanism through which Canseco a¤ected his peers in general, we would expect no e¤ect for pitchers, which is what we …nd in Table 5 .
To check the robustness of the results, we now systematically choose a sample powerhitting players who were comparable to Jose Canseco. Canseco made his professional debut in 1985, so we restrict our sample to players that started their career between 1981 and 1989. Next, we take only those players who are either on the top 100 list of career homeruns or those that were homerun hitting champions for any given year between 1985 and 2001 (for either league). Players on the all-time list obviously had great careers, while those that were hitting champions in a given year had at least one spectacular season.
Jose Canseco matches both of those criteria, as do several other players on the …nal list. Table 8 shows the …nal list of 27 players and indicates which criteria they matched to be included in the sample. The sample includes 7 players that we already examined (Canseco, Gri¤ey Jr., Fielder, Sandberg, McGwire, Palmeiro, and Gonzalez) and 20 new players. The estimated peer e¤ect of each one of these players is presented in Table 9 , which shows the estimated e¤ect of each player on …ve di¤erent performance measures for power hitters (homeruns, strikeouts, intentional walks, RBI's, and slugging percentage) and two performance measures for position players (batting average and slugging percentage). Table 9 shows once again how strikingly di¤erent Jose Canseco is from the rest of Overall, Table 9 shows that Canseco is highly unusual in comparison to all the elite homerun hitters of his generation. Hardly any other player displays any e¤ect on his peers, while Canseco has a strong positive e¤ect on every outcome. A few players do reveal a systematic pattern, but the pattern indicates a negative e¤ect on other players. This seems to be the case for Gri¤ey, Bonds, Sosa, Belle, and to a lesser extent, Gaetti and Palmeiro. These players are considered among the best within the 27 players listed in Table   9 , so once again, the completely opposite pattern for Canseco accentuates how truly unique he was.
It is important to note that our …ndings refute the idea that a common shock to all players in the same environment is responsible for the estimated peer e¤ect of Jose Canseco. In general, the identi…cation of a peer e¤ect is di¢ cult to disentangle from common shocks or unobserved characteristics shared by a group of people. However, there are several indications that this is not driving our results. First, Canseco played on ten di¤erent teams throughout his career, and the evidence is consistent with his claims to have injected steroids into the six named players during his tenure with at least three teams. Second, the positive e¤ect of Canseco on his peers shows up after they no longer play with him, and therefore, play for various teams across the league. A common, sustained shock across various teams which a¤ects only former teammates of Jose Canseco is highly unlikely. Third, although team managers may have surrounded Canseco with certain types of players, it remains a mystery why a team would do this only for Canseco and not the other 30 comparable power-hitters that we checked, and it is not likely that a manager would have the incentive or foresight to build a team around players that would signi…cantly improve their performance after they no longer play with Jose Canseco. In addition, the analysis includes a …xed-e¤ect for each player, which means that changes in the composition of players should not drive any of our results, since we are exploiting variation over time "within"the career of each player rather than variation across players.
Finally, we found no evidence of similar peer e¤ects for six power-hitters who played with Canseco and shared the same coaches and team characteristics. Taken as a whole, these …ndings present strong evidence that the e¤ect is coming from Canseco and not the shared characteristics of the team or the endogenous decisions of team managers.
Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that Jose Canseco had a signi…cant e¤ect on his former teammates. Speci…cally, we …nd that Canseco had a positive impact on outcomes such as slugging percentage, homeruns, strikeouts, intentional walks, base-on-balls, playing time, and other performance measures. The pattern of results are all indicative of increased power hitting performance. In contrast, we …nd no e¤ect of Canseco on his teammates'pitching output. In this manner, the results are consistent with Jose Canseco's claims that he helped his teammates increase their physical strength by introducing them to steroids, since physical strength is considered an important factor in hitting power but not particularly useful for pitching.
We have no direct evidence, however, that Jose Canseco's teammates learned about steroids directly or indirectly from him. We do know that the evidence strongly supports his claims that he improved the physical strength of his teammates, but we have no proof that the mechanism responsible for this e¤ect was steroids. It is possible that his teammates learned about strength conditioning or other work habits. However, this paper provides the …rst systematic study which shows that the evidence is consistent with Canseco's scandalous accusations. In particular, our …ndings support his claims that he were signi…cant, and most of the coe¢ cients that were signi…cant were in the opposite direction (decreasing the performance of their peers). Clearly, Jose Canseco had a very unusual e¤ect in comparison to players who had similar careers and even players who are suspected of using steroids. That is, Canseco is not just generally di¤erent from everyone else, but he appears to be unique even among known steroid users (Caminiti, Giambi, and Palmeiro). Therefore, if the source of the e¤ect that Canseco apparently had on his teammates'batting power was due to something other than steroids (work ethic, batting techniques, weight training regimen, etc.), why do we not see similar positive e¤ects from other elite players on their peers as well? Why would this mechanism be limited to playing with Jose Canseco?
In his book, Canseco named six speci…c teammates as players that he personally injected with steroids. When these names are deleted from the sample, the e¤ect of Canseco on his other teammates was diminished by roughly 50 percent for all outcomes, but the coe¢ cients were still signi…cant. This …nding supports Canseco's claims that his in ‡uence was much wider than the six people that he mentioned.
All of this evidence points to the powerful e¤ect one worker can have on many other co-workers. This particular case demonstrates how a "peer e¤ect" could be generated by one worker increasing the productivity of other workers, rather than working through behavioral channels such as peer pressure, shame, guilt, etc. Furthermore, this is a case where the mechanism may involve unethical means. As the literature on crime suggests, unethical behavior by one person can cause others to follow suit. 18 In the context of the workplace, once one worker starts doing it, he may obtain a competitive advantage which can only be neutralized by other workers doing the same.
Ken Caminiti estimated that half the players in baseball use steroids (Verducci, 2002) . Perhaps prone to exaggeration, Canseco claimed that 85 percent of major league baseball players did steroids. In his autobiography, baseball pitcher David Wells (2003) writes that "as of right now, I'd estimate 25 to 40 percent of all major leaguers are juiced.
But that number's fast rising." He goes on to explain why: "Down in the minors, where virtually every ‡at-broke, baloney-sandwich-eating Double-A prospect is chasing after the same, elusive, multimillion-dollar payday, the use of anabolic homer-helpers is ‡at-out booming . . . At just about 12 bucks per shot, those steroid vials must be seen as a really solid investment."
Canseco seems to implicitly agree with Wells -he never apologizes about using steroids or about giving them to others. To him, steroids are simply a way to boost your competitive advantage. A similar attitude could explain the widespread use of performanceenhancing drugs in other sports like cycling and track and …eld. Outside the world of sports, similar forces may be at work in terms of accounting practices, unprofessional behavior by lawyers, political corruption, public disclosures, cheating by students, accuracy in journalism, reporting in academic research, etc. In general, the knowledge that other workers or …rms are cheating could trigger others to do the same. In some cases, they will need to learn the unethical skill from a co-worker, but in some cases they may be able to
18 See Glaeser et. al. (1996) 20 …gure it out on their own or search for other sources. Overall, this paper highlights the idea that in the absence of a rigid and persistent enforcement mechanism over unethical behavior, market forces could lead to a "rat race" where workers are willing to do just about anything to remain competitive. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient came from a separate regression which is specified similarly to the ones in Table 3 but use the indicated player instead of Jose Canseco as the independent variable. The displayed coefficient from each regression is for the variable "after playing with" the indicated player. are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Each coefficient came from a separate regression which is specified similarly to the ones in Table 3 but use the indicated player instead of Jose Canseco as the independent variable. The displayed coefficient from each regression is for the variable "after playing with" the indicated player. The 27 players listed are the ones described in Table 8 .
